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The constitution and democracy in troubled times
Does textualism and
originalism approach positively
impact democracy?

mitment to giving final say about
what the Constitution means to the
judicial branch.
Why, according to textualist-originalists, mustjudges confine themany judges, including a maselves to discovering the original
jority of the justices who
meaning of constitutional text, ·
presently serve on the U.S.
rather than, say, construing it to
Supreme Court, would agree with
reach a more socially useful result?
the following statement: Judges
In a word, democracy. Judicial reshould interpret the Constitution acJOHN GREASE
view can only be tolerated in a
cording to its text, as that text was
democracy, they argue, if judges
Constitutional Connections
originally understood when it beserve as interpreters rather lawcrune law, even if that interpretation
makers when it comes to defining
conflicts with one that might better justify our practice of judicial review. the Constitution. All other apserve the public interest.
Judicial review, commonly traced to proaches inevitably involve a lifetenured elite imposing their moral
They argue that this "textualistthe Supreme Court's 1803 decision
originalist" approach is required to
in Marbury v. Madison, is our com- and policy preferences on the rest of
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us. And that is anti-democratic.
There is a powerful logic to this
argument. But what if we think of
the relationship between our Constitution and democracy in different
terms? What if, instead of prioritizing the theoretical, pro-democracy
benefits of textualism and originalism, we ask whether the policy outcomes these modes of analysis produce positively impact our democracy in fact?
Refraining the analysis in this
way raises questions about whether
a strict textualist-originalist approach to constitutional interpretaSEE CONSTITUTION C3

The Constitution and Am~rican democracy in troubled times
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Citizens United v. Federal
Election Commission (2010),

playing a significant role in increasing polarization, facilitattion actually advances demoa 5-4 decision holding that po- ing the emergence of extreme
cratic values. For the textual- litical spending is a form of
politicians, undermining the
prospects for legislative comism and originalism practiced protected speech under the
promise, and exacerbating
First Amendment, and that
by many of our justices and
judges has led them to regard the government may not keep distrust in the integrity and
corporations or unions from
as unconstitutional - ·or at
fairness of our electoral proleast constitutionally problem- spending money to support or cesses.
atic - many legislative redenounce individual candiBut the Supreme Court,
forms and judicial intervendates in elections. Thus, the
while acknowledging that extions that might help to shore regulation of money in politics treme partisan gerrymanderup our faltering democracy.
is at present largely a constiing can undermine rights and
Consider, for example, the
tutional no-go zone.
values protected by the Conrole of money in political camOr consider, for another ex- stitution, has held that held
paigns. Many believe that the ample, partisan gerrymander- that the federal courts cannot
nation would be well served by ing- the widespread practice order remedies for unconstithe enactment of experimenof state legislatures redrawing tutional partisan gerrymantal laws authorizing the public the boundaries of federal and dering. See Rucho v. Common
Cause (2019), another 5-4 definancing of elections, placing state legislative districts to
tighter limits on campaign
protect incumbents and to ad- cision which held that particontributions, and requiring
vance the interests of the ·
san gerrymandering claims
more transparency from the
party that controls the legisla- present political questions bepersons and interests that
ture. With the 2020 census re- yond the jurisdiction of the
federal courts.
fund politicians and political
cently completed, we are
organizations.
about to embark on another
Moreover, a majority of the
But laws of this sort are, if
round of redistricting across
Supreme Court harbors
not outright unconstitutional, the nation. And we
expect strong reservations about a
at least highly problematic un- , partisan gerrymandering to
practice adopted in a handful
der interpretations of the First be rampant.
of states in order to address
Amendment that the Supreme
There is broad agreement the problem of partisan gerryCourt has adopted in recent
among political scientists that mandering: the creation of independent redistricting comdecades. See, for example,
partisan gerrymandering is

-can

missions to redraw legislative
boundaries. In Arizona State

ther examples term limits and
the presidential line-item veto.
Many believe that the public
Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Cominterest would be well served
mission (2015), a slim 5-4
by placing limits on the numcourt majority rejected an ar- ber of terms that members of
gument by the Arizona legisla- Congress can serve, and by
ture that a state ballot initiaempowering the president to
tive creating an independent
strike wasteful provisions of
redistricting commission unlegislation enacted by
constitutionally cut the legisCongress while still permitlature out of the redistricting
ting the remaining provisions
process.
to become law.
But there has been a signifBut, here again, the
icant shift in the Supreme
Supreme Court has interpreted the Constitution to bar
Court's makeup since 2015,
and some of the newer justhese reform efforts. See U.S.
tices have expressed views
Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton
about the state legislature's
(1995), a 5-4 decision which
role in the electoral process
held that states cannot impose
that are more aligned with
qualifications for prospective
those of the Arizona Indepen- members of Congress (such
dent Redistricting Committee as term limits) that are
dissent. Therefore, if the court stricter than those specified in
revisits the issue, there is rea- the Constitution, and Clinton
son to be concerned that the
v. City ofNew York (1998), a 6creation of independent redis- 3 decision which held that legtricting commissions by ballot islation that passes both
initiative may no longer be a
Houses of Congress must eiconstitutional means of dealther be entirely approved (i.e.,
ing with the problem of partisigned) or rejected (i.e., vesan gerrymandering.
toed) by the president.
Finally, consider as two furThese cases may or may

not have been correctly decided. But the number of dissenting justices in each of
them strongly suggests that
the constitutional issue decided was not entirely clear.
Our democracy clearly is in
peril.So,perhapsthejustices
should think long and hard be- .
fore deciding that our ancient
constitutional text - enacted
at a time when so many were
excluded from the full benefits
of citizenship - should be read
to prevent We the People of
2021 from experimenting with
measures that could help to
save it? As Justice Robert
Jackson once put it, the Constitution was not intended to
be a suicide pact.

(John Greabe teaches constitutional law and directs
the Warren B. Rudman Center for Justice, Leadership &
Public Service at the University ofNew Hampshire
Franklin Pierce School of
Law. The opinions he expresses in his "Constitutional
Connections" columns are
entirely his own.)
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